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Abstract 
 
Background. Special services within public hospitals are becoming increasingly 
common in low and middle income countries with the stated objective of providing 
higher comfort services to affluent customers and generating resources for under 
funded hospitals. In the present study expenditures, outputs and costs are analysed for 
the Maputo Central Hospital and its Special Clinic with the objective of identifying 
net resource flows between a system operating two-tier charging, and, ultimately, 
understanding whether public hospitals can somehow benefit from running Special 
Clinic operations. Methods. A combination of step-down and bottom-up costing 
strategies were used to calculate recurrent as well as capital expenses, apportion them 
to identified cost centres and link costs to selected output measures. Results. The 
results show that cost differences between main hospital and clinic are marked and 
significant, with the Special Clinic’s cost per patient and cost per outpatient visit 
respectively over four times and over thirteen times their equivalent in the main 
hospital. Discussion. While the main hospital cost structure appeared in line with 
those from similar studies, salary expenditures were found to drive costs in the 
Special Clinic (73% of total), where capital and drug costs were surprisingly low (2 
and 4% respectively). We attributed low capital and drug costs to underestimation by 
our study owing to difficulties in attributing the use of shared resources and to the 
Special Clinic’s outsourcing policy. The large staff expenditure would be explained 
by higher physician time commitment, economic rents and subsidies to hospital staff. 
On the whole it was observed that: (a) the flow of capital and human resources was 
not fully captured by the financial systems in place and stayed largely unaccounted 
for; (b) because of the little consideration given to capital costs, the main hospital is 
more likely to be subsidising its Special Clinic operations, rather than the other way 
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around. Conclusion. We conclude that the observed lack of transparency may create 
scope for an inequitable cross subsidy of private customers by public resources. 
 
 
 
3 
Background 
 
‘Private’, ‘high-cost’ and ‘special’ clinics and wards are increasingly common 
features of public hospitals in Africa and other parts of the world [1,2]. These services 
are targeted at middle and upper class groups who are prepared to pay higher charges 
for services with higher levels of amenity (such as hotel services which are not 
considered clinically relevant), or in some cases for choice of doctor [1].  A common 
rationale for the development of such services is that they will generate resources for 
under-funded parts of the health system. For example in some Provinces of South 
Africa, the policy is being developed with the objective of generating resources 
largely for the primary care system [3]. In other settings, for example Zambia, 
resources are retained at hospital level with the objective of generating resources for 
services targeted at the majority of the population [4].  
 
However, the policy is not universally endorsed. It inevitably creates inequity by 
creating two-tier service provision. It may be difficult to maintain a quality separation 
between the two services based only on amenity levels, and to ensure comparable 
clinical quality of care [1,2]. Equally difficult to establish is the balance of net 
resource flows between services. Accounting systems are seldom set up to enable this. 
Private clinic and ward users access services from all over the hospital where there is 
no dedicated service. Resources generated through private services are seldom lodged 
in a single profit and loss account and then distributed. Financial transactions are 
complex. No study that we know of has traced resource flows through the full breadth 
of a hospital operating a two-tier charging strategy with the objective of identifying 
net resource flows between the two services. This was the objective of the study 
reported in this paper.  
 
In Mozambique, the existence of dual practice is recognised with both public sector 
physicians owning private clinics and others providing private services within central, 
provincial, general and, to some extent rural hospitals – the so-called “special 
services” and “special clinics” [5]. At the time of the study, Maputo Central Hospital 
(MCH) was the largest hospital in Mozambique with 1,518 beds and about 2,000 
employees. The creation of the MCH Special Clinic was authorised in 1977 after 
independence by the FRELIMO ruling party and then regulated by the Government 
through successive legislation, with the objective of providing adequate care for party 
members and international diplomatic officials in Maputo [6,7]. According to the 
original regulation, selected venues of the MCH were to be rehabilitated for the 
purpose, and MCH staff was to serve in the special clinic outside their regular shift for 
extra compensation. Since 1977 the special clinic has grown to include 4 departments, 
36 beds and employs 71 full time staff, for an annual turnover of about 1 million 
USD. The special clinic offers all the services available in the main hospital, offering 
patients the advantages of choice of physicians and time of visit, booking service, and 
attendance in separate facilities. The majority of special clinic activities take place in 
the restricted premises assigned to the clinic, with the exception of surgical operations 
and laboratory analysis, for which the special clinic makes use of the main hospital 
facilities in exchange for direct payments to personnel and departments involved. 
Heads of department and selected medical staff from the main hospital serve in the 
special clinic. Nurses and non-medical staff from the main hospital rotate annually to 
work a regular shift in the special clinic. The special clinic pays a monthly sum of 200 
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million MZM (about 10,000USD at the time of the study) to the main hospital as a 
contribution to the MCH general expenses. 
 
In MCH, the special clinic sits uncomfortably adjacent to the accident and emergency 
department. This means that critically ill patients waiting long periods for services in 
hot and dusty conditions can view richer hospital users with more minor conditions 
securing fast access to service in comfortable conditions. This makes the two-tier 
service unpopular and politically conspicuous. Since the 2005 election the new 
FRELIMO government signalled its intention to abolish the institution of Special 
Clinics across the country, and a new minister from the MCH was put in charge to 
reform the system under a highly publicised anticorruption agenda [8]. In 2007, a ban 
on private practice within hospital facilities was introduced, to eliminate special 
services and special clinics within the country’s major hospitals, although still 
allowing publicly employed physicians to practice in private clinics outside their 
public hospital hours [9]. With a sudden change of leadership in 2011, the debate 
around the MCH Special Clinic appears to have died out.  
 
To date, a few costing studies [10,11] have been carried out focusing on specific parts 
of the hospital but this was the first to cover MCH as a whole and to include costing 
of the Special Clinic.  
Methods 
Data were collected and analysed during 2001, pertaining to the financial year 2000-
2001. 
 
Step-down costing 
 
Most cost items were estimated using a step-down costing method [12]. This method 
uses data available at hospital level and disaggregates by direct cost centre and 
indirect cost centre. A direct cost centre is a unit within the hospital that directly 
produces the output of interest, for example inpatient or outpatient stays and visits. An 
indirect cost centre is a unit, which does so indirectly, for example by producing 
diagnostic test results, which are the constituent components of an outpatient, stay or 
visit.  
 
Costs were apportioned using the apportionment criteria described in Table 1, in some 
cases via an intermediate cost centre. Intermediate cost centres that were themselves 
direct consumers of resources were apportioned to final cost centres using the criteria 
described in Table 2.  
 
Table 1 <here> 
Table 2 <here> 
 
Bottom-up costing 
 
Step-down costing was complemented by selective use of bottom-up costing for the 
specific major inputs, staff, drugs and medical supplies, and capital items [13]. The 
choice and combination of methods depended on the nature and estimated reliability 
of data at different points in the hospital and are described for each of the main cost 
categories.  
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Staff costs: Number of staff by grade, department and/or service unit, permanent or 
contract was established by visiting all department heads. Salary mid-points and 
average or standard allowance packages were calculated for each staff grade. These 
combined to produce estimates of annual total staff costs for each service unit or 
department as appropriate. At the special clinic, aggregate annual personnel costs for 
both permanent and contract workers were obtained from the financial statement and 
from service specific cost records. Discrepancies were found between the two sources 
and the aggregate financial statement was apportioned according to the shares of staff 
costs in the service specific cost records.  
 
 
Drug and medical supplies costs: A centralised and computerised system of drugs 
distribution and consumption by service units was used at MCH. Price data were 
obtained from government tender documents used in drug and medical supply 
procurement, and from private pharmacies where those were not available. The 
hospital pharmacy did collate patient origin – inpatient or outpatient – data. A review 
of dispensing records for the previous 3 weeks was carried out to estimate 
apportionment factors. Like drugs, medical supplies are sourced from Central Medical 
Stores but there is a specific warehouse that stores and distributes all types of medical 
supply (but not surgical supplies) once received by the hospital. The central operating 
theatre stores and distributes surgical supply. The medical supplies warehouse keeps 
stock records. A randomly selected 3-month sample of these was reviewed in order to 
apportion medical supplies costs. For surgical supplies, the central operating theatre 
keeps no records but the consumption pattern for six smaller theatres was established 
through requisition records kept in each. Following examples in the literature on 
allocating drugs expenditures across hospital cost centres [14], the unaccounted for 
receipts by the central operating theatre were assumed to be consumed directly there.  
 
For the special clinic, some drugs were obtained from the main pharmacy and it was 
attempted to capture this consumption by the methods described above. In addition, 
the special clinic privately procures drugs and medical supplies. A computerised 
database includes drugs and medical supplies dispensed per patient, although it is not 
possible to classify patients by service unit (inpatient and outpatient) using this 
database. Instead, these costs were apportioned using inpatient equivalents calculated 
as patient days for the clinics involving the assumption that patient days are 
equivalent to attendances divided by the average length of stay (3.47 days in the 
special clinic).  
 
Capital costs: Annual capital costs were collected from hospital level data and 
apportioned according to an inventory of furniture and movable equipment, valued at 
replacement cost. The estimated allocation to each service unit was annuitised using a 
discount rate of 5%. Rent values based on floor space were used to value buildings, 
many of which have no book value if a 30-year life is assumed.  
 
Using the allocation of total cost to final cost centres which in turn had used a 
combination of step-down and bottom-up costing methods, unit costs were calculated 
on the basis of the activity statistics inpatient days, admissions and outpatient visits. 
Costs for intermediate cost centres’ outputs: images, clinical tests, theatre cases, blood 
units, physiotherapy treatments and pathology tests were also calculated. The 
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hospital’s health information system database (computerised) was the main source of 
these data although in some cases supplementary data were collected from individual 
service units.  
 
In the process of allocating costs to the special clinic, we encountered a number of 
difficulties. All the human resources costs borne by the clinic are accounted for in the 
clinic’s books and paid directly to the MCH personnel as extra salary. Some special 
clinic costs like water and electricity bills are paid by the MCH and reported in the 
main hospital accounting books only. The clinic also purchases other specific goods 
and services (e.g. blood bags) from the hospital and these are paid directly to the 
hospital department/unit and reported in both the clinic and department books. 
Renting of MCH facilities and equipment and occasional drug supplies from the 
hospital to the clinic are not reported or accounted for.  
 
Many MCH regular staff work extra hours and provide occasional services for the 
clinic. Although such costs are accounted for by the clinic, these are never discounted 
by the MCH side, whether they took place outside the hospital regular shift hours or 
not. Within the clinic very few workers are assigned exclusively to a specific 
department, and personnel costs had to be apportioned according to inpatient 
equivalents. 
 
The effect of these limitations in our ability to track resource flows through the 
hospital is that costs of the special clinic measured exclude a number of allocations of 
shares of costs incurred by MCH. To the extent that these do not imply increased 
resource use in MCH, they imply a measure of cost close to average incremental cost. 
In other respects, where MCH costs are directly impacted by the special clinic, they 
understate the average incremental cost.  
Results 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show selected unit costs by inpatient service unit for MCH and all unit 
costs by service unit for the special clinic respectively. The selected costs for MCH 
represent the range of costs and the different departments of the hospital. 
 
Table 3 <here> 
 
The differences between both types of unit costs in the two tables were marked and 
significant (p<0.05 for admission; p<0.001 for patient day). Such a crude comparison 
ignores case mix differences, which are very difficult to control for. Given the smaller 
number of service units, the special clinics service units catered for a heterogeneous 
mix of patients. Except in Clinic Sur (Emergency and Resuscitation) where patients 
tend to stay for a shorter period and are rapidly transferred, costs per admission were 
higher than even the most expensive specialist service units in MCH: neurology and 
general surgery. Even Clinic Sur costs per admission were higher than all but 3 
specialist service units in MCH. (Costs per admission for Oncology in MCH, not 
included in Table 3, were 11,141,000 meticais.) Cost per patient day is everywhere in 
the special clinics at least four-fold the cost per patient day in any specialist unit of 
MCH. 
 
Table 4 <here> 
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A similar comparison is made between outpatient costs in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 <here> 
 
The special clinic cost per outpatient visit was over 13-fold the cost for the highest 
cost service unit of MCH. That costs were significantly higher was expected given the 
expected difference in amenity levels between the two services. However, differences 
were greater, especially in the outpatient and patient day comparisons than easily 
explained by amenity alone, or by potential case mix differences.  
 
There was also a marked difference in the share of capital and recurrent costs in the 
total between MCH and the special clinic. The total cost for the Special Clinic was 
50bn meticais of which 98% was recurrent expenditure and 2% capital. In contrast, 
MCH had a more typical capital and recurrent cost balance. Of a total of M232bn, 
85% was recurrent and 15% capital. The low level of capitalisation of the special 
clinics reflects its policy of outsourcing (largely from MCH) capital intensive services 
such as diagnostics and theatre, and is suggestive of the extent to which we have 
under-estimated the special clinic’s use of these.  
 
Table 6 compares the breakdown of recurrent costs between MCH and the special 
clinic.  
 
Table 6 <here> 
 
While a similar share of recurrent costs is accounted for by medical supplies, goods 
and services, the special clinic uses 73% of its recurrent resources for staff costs, and 
only 4% for drugs whereas MCH spends approximately equally on the two items. One 
explanation of this difference is the much higher expenditure on personnel in absolute 
terms in the special clinic. 61% of staff costs were physician costs. Physicians are 
mostly employed by the special clinic on a contract basis, and mostly paid on a per-
visit or per-patient basis. Most of these physicians are full time employees of MCH 
but earn much more per hour on contract to the special clinic than through their MCH 
salaries. Despite the huge difference in the proportionate expenditure on drugs, 
special clinic patients still receive on average a higher value of drugs per inpatient day 
equivalent (M106,000) than MCH patients (M87,000). However these amounts are so 
small that it seems likely that special clinic patients’ consumption has been under-
estimated for reasons discussed above. Widespread unavailability and under provision 
of drugs in MCH is well known but is not a concern in the special clinic.  
 
Table 7 shows costs of the extent of use of MCH services that we were able to trace. 
The total is small and amounts to approximately 2% of total special clinic 
expenditure. The special clinic makes a direct contribution to the income of MCH 
which amounts to M3.6bn, or 7% of total special clinic expenditure. In addition to 
this, certain ex-gratia payments are made to heads of sections and heads of nursing 
services, although these amount only to about M750m (about 1.5% of total special 
clinic expenditure). 
 
Table 7 <here> 
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At the time of the study the special clinic was charging 520,000 MT (25USD) for an 
outpatient visit and 4,000,000 MT (200USD) for day spent in hospital, while the main 
hospital was either free for patients referred from other institutions or charging a 
“congestion fee” of 50,000 MT (2.3USD) per patient. The implication of this was that 
the clinic’s marginal revenues were set below the average incremental costs shown 
above, which are themselves likely underestimates. 
 
Discussion 
 
Despite the care that was taken to measure costs throughout the hospital and the 
special clinic, it seems that hospital records do not allow for the full identification of 
the use of MCH resources by the special clinic. A comparison of average incremental 
cost with marginal revenue indicates that the special clinic is cross-subsidised by 
MCH. 
 
Furthermore, the estimates provided are almost certainly underestimates of the 
average incremental cost. A 2% rate of capitalisation is not viable for the well-
functioning service that the special clinic appears to be. Although out-sourcing is a 
potential explanation and means of translating capital into recurrent cost, tracing costs 
through the major supplier of out-sourced services MCH, should translate those back 
to capital costs if the use of MCH made by the special clinic had been fully captured. 
Case-mix and focus on human resources-intensive activities like outpatient visits 
could help explain the relatively small share of the clinic’s capital costs. 
 
One review of hospital costing studies in developing countries suggests capitalisation 
levels (capital cost as a share of total cost) ranging from 17.8 to 43.8% where capital 
costs were thought to have been fully accounted for [15]. A study of 6 hospitals in 
Malawi measured capitalisation levels between 47 and 57% though used a different 
methodology from that used here, and may have overestimated the rate [16]. A study 
by one of the present authors in Zimbabwe, using an identical methodology to that 
used here and found capitalisation rates between 36 and 59% across 6 hospitals [17]. 
The capitalisation rate can vary widely across studies according to method of cost 
accounting and in cases of severe under-investment over a long period can drop well 
below the rates cited above. For example, a study of Niamey national hospital in 
Niger found a rate as low as 5% in a context where ‘relatively little capital equipment 
… is operational’ [18]. Nevertheless, this is quite unlike the situation of the special 
clinic and we consider the 18% figure, the lowest of those compared across a range of 
settings where the methodology was judged sufficiently sound, the lower bound of a 
realistic capitalisation rate here.  On that basis, there is approximately a shortfall of at 
least M8bn in the capital resource use of the special clinic that we have been able to 
account for. This significantly exceeds the full extent of the transfer payment from the 
special clinic to MCH. That payment would allow for a capitalisation rate of only 
10.5%.  
 
We also suspect that the special clinic’s use of MCH’s pharmaceutical stocks has 
been underestimated. The costing studies cited above can also be used to compare the 
expenditure on drugs as a share of recurrent costs, none reaching anything like as 
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small a share as the 4.1% measured for the special clinic. The range for medical 
supplies as a whole across developing country settings was 10.3 to 32% [13], and for 
the six Malawian hospitals, 24.3 to 37.4% [14]. However, there are other possibilities 
than that any deficit in our drug use estimates have been at the expense of the MCH 
pharmacy. It is possible that we have failed to trace the special clinic’s own 
expenditures on drugs, or that special clinic patients commonly take prescriptions to 
private pharmacies rather than receive and be billed for drugs in the clinic itself. 
 
We face considerable difficulty in deciding how to treat the large expenditure on 
physician salaries. The above analysis treats these as cost. In principle, we seek to 
measure the opportunity cost of the resources used. Where these resources are traded 
in a competitive market, it is reasonable to treat price as equivalent to opportunity 
cost. However, the market for physician labour is distorted. Since most doctors work 
for the Ministry of Health, the Ministry is close to being a monopsonist purchaser of 
physician labour and exerts undue influence on the going salary rate. This produces a 
downward pressure on salaries and implies that MCH salaries understate the 
opportunity cost of physician labour. In the special clinic, effective salary rates are 
much higher, whereas economic theory would predict that a slightly higher salary 
than the public sector rate would attract ample supply of labour. There are at least 
three possible explanations of this: 
 
1. While doctors have no alternative employment opportunities to public sector 
jobs, agency problems in the health sector imply that their commitment to 
those jobs and effort levels may be low without loss of salary. In order to 
purchase commitment and effort that may be required by higher monitoring 
capacity in the special clinic, higher levels of salary may be required. This 
implies that the salary levels observed indeed reflect opportunity cost and 
suggests no adjustments to our estimates are necessary. 
 
2. Doctors in MCH may be the effective principals of the special clinic. 
Hospitals may be viewed as ‘physician’s co-operatives’ [19] or more generally 
doctors may be their dominant decision makers [20]. This suggests that the 
special clinic may be allowed to function only by permission of doctors, and 
may buy this consent through the payment of high salary levels there. In this 
case, the salary levels observed are not opportunity costs but economic rents, 
or transfer payments, which should not be considered part of the costs of 
operation. This perspective has significant implications for our estimates as 
45% of total special clinic costs are accounted for by payments to physicians.  
However, even if we assume that the real opportunity cost of physicians is 
zero, this downward adjustment is insufficient to bring special clinics’ average 
incremental cost as low as marginal revenues for outpatient visits. In other 
words, the price charged for outpatient visits does not cover the non-physician 
staff time and other inputs. Inpatient charges would cover non-physician costs 
and approximately 55% of physician costs which is more than the public 
sector salary (which we assume below opportunity cost) and less than the 
special clinic salary which may contain an element of economic rent.  
 
3. Current salary levels in MCH may be below the reservation wage, or the 
minimum required to secure the services of doctors in the labour market. By 
subsidising those wages through payments for work in the special clinic, 
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doctors work for MCH as a whole may be secured. On this argument, the 
amounts paid to doctors might be considered a subsidy to MCH, which could 
be added to the transfer payments already identified. We cannot be more 
precise about the extent of this potential subsidy without further knowledge of 
the reservation wage.  
 
Similar arguments can be made in relation to the transfer payments paid to MCH 
including the ex-gratia payments made to certain heads of MCH departments. These 
can be considered payment to cover the special clinic’s use of MCH resources 
including administration by these individuals, or they may be considered rents that do 
not reflect resource flows from MCH to the special clinic. In principle, they should be 
included in or excluded from special clinic cost accordingly. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cost differences between MCH and the special clinic are large, particularly when 
outpatient and costs per patient day are compared. The differences are of an order of 
magnitude that cannot be explained credibly by case mix difference. By far the 
greatest contribution to the cost difference is the physician salary component, if this is 
indeed an opportunity cost and reflects the cost of achieving commitment and effort 
from doctors. This reflects both higher application of physician hours and a higher 
rate of pay per hour. This in itself suggests that cost differences do not reflect 
differences in amenity levels alone. 
 
The price charged for special clinic services does not cover the cost of those services 
if the full expenditure on physician salaries is considered part of that cost. For 
outpatients, the price charged is insufficient to cover even non-physician time and 
other inputs used. This implies that MCH subsidises the special clinic, and that the 
government subsidy provided to MCH leaks to the support of the special clinic. If the 
physician salaries are instead interpreted as economic rents, the special clinic 
arrangement enables physicians to capture a share of the subsidy provided by the 
government to the MCH, presumably at the expense of patients there. Either way, it 
would appear that the special clinic imposes costs on users of MCH.  
 
We were unable to capture fully the extent of special clinic use of resources in MCH. 
Those captured totalled approximately M1bn, only 2% of total special clinic resource 
use. The extent to which this represents an under-measurement of resource use is 
indicated by the low resulting measured level of capitalisation of the special clinic, 
also amounting to approximately 2%. A more likely minimum level of capitalisation, 
equal to that of MCH itself of 15% suggests a minimum resource flow from MCH to 
the special clinic of M6.5bn (assuming this resource flow was 100% capital) or 
M13bn (assuming a 50-50 split). It is likely that we also under-estimated special clinic 
patients’ use of the MCH pharmacy. 
 
Despite the attempts to separate sites and management, there is still considerable 
difficulty in accounting for the flow of resources between the main hospital and the 
clinic, especially of human resources and capital goods. There is a need to develop 
accounting systems that ensure greater transparency in order to establish that 
arrangements in the special clinic make the net contribution to public sector services 
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for the majority they often claim to make. In the absence of such a transparent system 
demonstrating an equity promoting cross-subsidy, it is unsurprising that popular 
disapproval threatens the continuing operation of these arrangements.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Cost categories and apportionment methods 
Cost category Indirect cost centre (where 
applicable) 
Final apportionment  
Non-salary personnel 
expenses  
Per diems 
Funeral subsidy 
 
 
Administration 
 
 
 
Inpatient equivalents 
Total salary cost 
Goods 
Fuel and lubricants 
Infrastructure maintenance 
Equipment maintenance 
Perishable stationery 
Uniform and shoes 
Other perishable goods 
 
Transport and logistics 
 
 
Administration 
 
Administration 
 
Number of admissions 
Floor space 
Equipment value 
Inpatient equivalents 
Total staff numbers 
Inpatient equivalents 
12 
Services 
Communications 
Flight tickets 
Facility rent 
Infrastructure maintenance 
Equipment maintenance 
Transport and cargo 
Insurance 
Legal representation 
Consultancy and technical 
assistance 
Water and electricity 
Health information 
Other services 
 
Administration 
Administration 
Administration 
 
 
Transport/logistics 
Administration 
Administration 
 
Administration 
 
Administration 
 
Inpatient equivalents 
Inpatient equivalents 
Inpatient equivalents 
Space 
Equipment value 
Admissions 
Inpatient equivalents 
Inpatient equivalents 
 
Inpatient equivalents 
Floor space 
Inpatient equivalents 
Floor space 
Current transfers 
Customs tax 
 
Administration 
 
Inpatient equivalents 
 
 
Table 2: Apportionment method used for intermediate cost centres 
Intermediate cost centre Apportionment 
Central operating theatre Number of operations 
Blood Consumption of blood units 
Pathology Pathology investigations ordered 
Clinical analysis Laboratory tests ordered 
Imaging Images requested 
Pharmacy Drug consumption 
Food provision Patient and staff days 
Laundry Patient days 
Hygiene and cleaning Floor space 
Mortuary Admissions 
Transport and logistics Admissions 
Administration Inpatient equivalents 
 
 
 
Table 3: Selected unit costs by inpatient service unit, MCH (‘000 meticais, FY2001). 
Department 
Service Unit 
 
Cost per admission 
 
Cost per patient day 
Department of Medicine 
General medicine ward 1 
General medicine ward 3 
Neurology 
 
2,204 
1,348 
17,459 
 
362 
240 
396 
Department of Surgery 
General surgery 
General abdominal 
Urology 
 
15,889 
2,264 
4,478 
 
1,414 
534 
498 
Department of paediatrics 
Short duration 
Neonatal care 
 
275 
1,231 
 
413 
228 
13 
Malnutrition 2,414 205 
Department of orthopaedics 
Male orthopaedics 1 
Female orthopaedics  
Paediatrics 
 
6,603 
5,482 
3,017 
 
280 
290 
316 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
General obstetrics 
Gynaecology 
 
915 
2,301 
 
681 
285 
(M‘000, FY2001) 
 
 
Table 4: Special clinic: unit costs by inpatient service unit (Cost M’000 excluding 
drugs and capital in parentheses) 
Service Unit Cost per admission Cost per patient day 
Clinic Sur 9,771 (9,318) 5,235 (4,992) 
Clinic I 25,054 (23,650) 4,956 (4,678) 
Clinic II 18,684 (17,450) 5,032 (4,705) 
Clinic III 39,029 (35,593) 5,020 (4,707) 
Currency: M‘000, FY2001. 
 
Table 5: Cost per outpatient visit: MCH 
Service unit Cost per outpatient visit  
Medical outpatients 48 
Surgical outpatients 92 
Paediatric outpatients 56 
Orthopaedic outpatients 84 
Obstetrics and gynaecology outpatients 95 
Special clinic 1,302 
Currency: M‘000, FY2001. 
 
 
Table 6: Recurrent costs by category, MCH and special clinic (million meticais) 
Recurrent cost category MCH total cost (% share) Special clinic total cost (% 
share) 
Personnel  65,130       (33) 35,953   (73) 
Drugs  69,479       (35) 1,910    (4) 
Medical supplies  23,756       (12) 2,260   (5) 
Goods  29,808       (15) 4,984 (10) 
Services    9,020         (5) 3,989 (8) 
TOTAL 197,193    (100) 49,095   (100) 
 
 
Table 7: Special clinic non-salary recurrent costs borne by MCH 
Recurrent cost category Cost (M‘000) 
Water and electricity 93,314 
Maintenance of infrastructure 47,554 
Imaging 164,600 
Physiotherapy 16,514 
Morgue 1,270 
14 
Theatre 418.233 
Laboratory 98.027 
Pathology 39,036 
Blood 54,084 
TOTAL 932,633 
Currency: M‘000, FY2001. 
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